The sixth amendment right to a speedy trial benefits

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to a “speedy and public trial.” Both prongs of this guarantee bind not only the Federal Government but also, through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the states.1 Footnote
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223–26 (1967) (holding that speedy trial right applies against the states); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 272–73 (1948) (holding the right to public trial applicable against the states); see Amdt14.S1.3.1 Overview and Amdt14.S1.3.2 Early Doctrine (discussing the due process clause and incorporation). The speedy and public trial rights spring from hoary principles of the Anglo-American system of criminal justice.2 Footnote
See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 564 (1980) ( “[T]hroughout its evolution [in Anglo-American justice], the trial has been open to all who care to observe.” ); Klopfer , 386 U.S. at 223 (noting twelfth-century origins of speedy trial right). Both rights, however, are not absolute. They are subject to important limitations as to the scope of protection that they provide and the particular portion of the criminal process to which they apply.

The speedy trial right applies only to criminal proceedings between the initiation of formal charges and a judgment of conviction; notably, the right does not cover delays in bringing criminal charges or delays in sentencing.3 Footnote
Betterman v. Montana , 578 U.S. 437, 439 (2016) . But “[f]or inordinate delay in sentencing, although the Speedy Trial Clause does not govern, a defendant may have other recourse, including, in appropriate circumstances, tailored relief under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Id. The Supreme Court has set forth a flexible four-factor balancing test that governs whether a delay between charge and conviction violates the right, and the remedy for a violation is dismissal of the criminal charges with prejudice.4 Footnote
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521–22 (1972) .

The public trial right, which applies to criminal trials and some pre-trial proceedings,5 Footnote
See Presley v. Georgia , 558 U.S. 209, 213 (2010) (per curiam) ( “[T]he Sixth Amendment right to a public trial extends to the voir dire of prospective jurors.” ); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 47 (1984) (holding the public trial right applicable to pre-trial suppression hearings). prohibits closing the courtroom to members of the public over the defendant’s objection unless overriding interests require their exclusion.6 Footnote
Waller , 467 U.S. at 48 . The remedy for a violation of the public trial right depends on the circumstances of the violation and will usually entitle the defendant to a new trial, although if the violation occurred at a pre-trial proceeding, the remedy may be limited to a repeat of that particular proceeding and a subsequent assessment of whether a new trial should follow.7 Footnote
See id. at 50 .

Footnotes 1 Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223–26 (1967) (holding that speedy trial right applies against the states); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 272–73 (1948) (holding the right to public trial applicable against the states); see Amdt14.S1.3.1 Overview and Amdt14.S1.3.2 Early Doctrine (discussing the due process clause and incorporation). 2 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 564 (1980) ( “[T]hroughout its evolution [in Anglo-American justice], the trial has been open to all who care to observe.” ); Klopfer , 386 U.S. at 223 (noting twelfth-century origins of speedy trial right). 3 Betterman v. Montana , 578 U.S. 437, 439 (2016) . But “[f]or inordinate delay in sentencing, although the Speedy Trial Clause does not govern, a defendant may have other recourse, including, in appropriate circumstances, tailored relief under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Id. 4 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521–22 (1972) . 5 See Presley v. Georgia , 558 U.S. 209, 213 (2010) (per curiam) ( “[T]he Sixth Amendment right to a public trial extends to the voir dire of prospective jurors.” ); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 47 (1984) (holding the public trial right applicable to pre-trial suppression hearings). 6 Waller , 467 U.S. at 48 . 7 See id. at 50 .